<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Supply Chain on Stack Research</title><link>https://stackresearch.org/tags/supply-chain/</link><description>Recent content in Supply Chain on Stack Research</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://stackresearch.org/tags/supply-chain/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>NHI and Agentic Risk: Third-Party Tools</title><link>https://stackresearch.org/research/nhi-asi-series-06-third-party-tools/</link><pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://stackresearch.org/research/nhi-asi-series-06-third-party-tools/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Every third-party tool an agent invokes is someone else&amp;rsquo;s code running near your credentials.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An agent&amp;rsquo;s tool registry includes a data-formatting utility maintained outside the organization. A routine update pulls a compromised transitive dependency. The agent calls the tool while a database connection string is in scope. The tool still appears to work: it parses the data, returns the expected shape, and keeps the task moving. It also sends the connection string to an external endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>