Should Agency Drift with Time?
Time checks help, but they often patch a deeper problem: agentic systems still treat time as one shared now, even when observers tick in different frames.
Articles connected to this term.
Time checks help, but they often patch a deeper problem: agentic systems still treat time as one shared now, even when observers tick in different frames.
Agentic risk awareness is an operational discipline: model the failure paths, constrain authority, force uncertainty to surface, and continuously test whether the system still behaves under stress.
A controlled incident drill shows how scope validation, lineage, blast-radius assessment, kill paths, and rollback evidence make agent failure visible enough to engineer against.
Every third-party tool an agent invokes is someone else's code running near your credentials.
Agent workflows need artifact-intake controls for transcripts, archives, logs, manifests, benchmarks, and training-corpus candidates before those materials cross into trusted local state.
Risk often appears between changes, not inside one change. Agent systems become dangerous when short-lived input hardens into durable memory and outlives the assumptions that made it safe.
A three-prompt staging drill shows how authority theater, urgency pressure, and policy language can steer agent behavior across trust boundaries.
Agent systems are often designed for launch day. The first hour after a bad action needs its own recovery layer: freeze, trace, contain, rollback, and harden.
When people use machine credentials, intent is blurred and audit trails break. Agents make that ambiguity harder to contain.
A sanitized regression case where dangerous text crossed an agent boundary, appeared in a customer-facing draft, and became a permanent ASI02 test.
Agent incidents often begin as ordinary non-human identity failures. This opener maps OWASP NHI risks to agentic AI systems and explains why identity controls define the reachable tool surface.